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  Our concepts of chemical plant safety have expanded over the past decades 
from concentrating on the plant and its operation to the effects on the 
environment, and on nearby and even distant communities. Safe transportation 
and final disposition of products and waste materials, prescribed by law in 
a growing number of countries, have become the responsibility of manu-
facturers, extending their liability beyond geographic boundaries and 
stretching it over time. 
  Such broad areas of responsibility require over-all management control. 
To sustain it, management structures must be set up, activities precisely 
programmed, and contingency plans readied. For all of these activities 
information and communication are critical. They are tools to help 
coordinate people, equipment, and materials across great distances. This 
paper examines information and communication as tools that enhance safety 
management. 
  As industrial processes have become more complex and companies are 
carrying out global trade activities they must increasingly rely on the 
fast developing computer and communication technologies to maintain the 
necessary control. Industrial experience built up over the years, improved 
management tools, and insights gained from research in the social and
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cognitive sciences, all contribute to ensure that operations are safe, that 
people respond to the challenges of the job in routine situations and react 
swiftly to control emergencies. Some excellent work has been carried out 
in the chemical industries to make the work-place safer and the environment 
unpolluted. We have also progressed considerably in our understanding of the 
complexities of safety management. Yet, as Roger Batstone commented 
recently, we have reached a lowland plateau in the identification, 
assessment, and prevention of major  hazards.' 
  Safety and emergency resource management is such an enormous challenge 
because it goes beyond process design and technology; greater consideration 
of human factors is needed but, even if better understood, this would not 
by itself be sufficient. In this paper when I refer to safety, I include 
human, material, and environmental protection and safety preparedness. 
References to management practices and community interaction are based on 
practices in the United States. Albeit there are significant differences 
between the Japanese management style built on consensus, and the U.S. 
pattern of management by directives emanating from the top, in reality, 
management of the best companies in the two countries also bear great 
similarities. In any case--whatever the culture, whether a company or a 
government department is involved--it is essential that feedback and 
evaluation capabilities be built into the system, and, most of all, that 
the flow of necessary data to those responsible for decision making be 
ensured and messages concerning required actions are signalled down the line. 
  Safety concerns arose gradually in organizations, touching on internal 
as well as some external operations, and becoming the responsibility of 
different units. Safety within the plant was in the jurisdiction of one
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group; process design was the responsibility of engineering; environmental 
and health concerns may have been assigned to different departments; and 
community response has become  more coordinated only in recent years. A 
flurry of internal reviews and installation of additional safeguards follows 
each major industrial accident, as the list of disasters is repeated at 
professional meetings like a cadence of a mourners prayer. There is a need, 
however, for integrated safety management, and for making deliberate, well 
thought-out changes over time rather than reacting to major disasters with 
soul searching intensity. Unless management attitudes toward safety undergo 
a fundamental change, however, this pattern is bound to continue. 
  Information and communication are management tools that will enable better 
coordination. They have also been managed in a disjointed fashion in major 
organizations. Only with the development of powerful computing capabilities, 
improved telecommunication, reliable desk-top computers, distributed 
networks, and the availability of increasingly sophisticated software have 
steps been taken towards coordinating corporate information systems.2 These 
developments, together with robotics and the new possibilities offered by 
the still unexploited interactive optical disc technologies, can provide 
opportunities to build a suitable infrastructure needed for better 
coordinated safety management. 
  It has been shown that major disasters had been the result of multiple 
small failures--of inadequate control. A change in conditions, in which 
failures are pointed up and then corrected at an early stage, can only be 
brought about by a changed attitude towards safety in the organization. 
Successful safety and emergency response management in a company is a major, 
expensive, and continuous effort. Therefore, it can be carried out
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effectively only if senior management is fully committed to it. Only such 
a commitment can create the climate that encourages concern for safety and 
consistent practices throughout the organization. Companies are putting 
great effort into training and taking a variety of costly safety measures. 
Nonetheless, in many cases they will only comply with explicit safety 
measures required by government regulations and, imposed more subtly, by 
the socio-political climate in the country. 
  In this paper I am suggesting the use of and  development of an additional 
tool to tighten up safety and emergency management and build in preventive 
measures throughout the organization: an information/communication-check 
(ICC). Just as electric lines or the soundness of pipelines are checked 
out, the transmission of information and communication that affects safety 
can be checked out throughout the entire system. Just as energy audits were 
instituted in the United States in the 1970s to exercise control over the 
total use of energy, it is suggested to examine critically the breadth of 
information transmission and communication in all areas that might affect 
safety, health, and the environment. 
  The suggested ICC would be more complex by orders of magnitudes than the 
more straightforward electrical check, requiring considerable time, effort, 
and cost. An ICC could, however, be started in critical areas and then 
extend to others. Once set up, howeve r , information and conmun icat ion 
channels could be checked out regularly, gaps could thus be identified, and 
specific areas needing improvement pinpointed. If well done, feedforward 
and feedback could be ensured and evaluated. Whenever a change is made in 
operations, the information and communication components would also be
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reviewed, ensuring that they are properly connected up, and thus bring about 
a safer transition and reduce future risk. 
  The ICC would not be a substitute for risk or safety analyses or other 
measures for emergency preparedness. But examining the system from a new 
angle,  ICC offers an additional mechanism for a more coordinated, tighter 
safety and emergency management. If a safety device were disabled, for 
instance, the ICC would point up questions must be raised, whenever there 
was no clear-cut response to a signal, or a need to install a secondary 
device. Systematic information/communication checks would also help the 
integration of safety management. Thus the resolution of questions raised 
by an ICC would do more than improve safety: it would also strengthen the 
overall management of the organization. 
  Based on experience in the management of corporate information resources, 
we know that tracking all information flows for all likely scenarios would 
prove to be too time consuming and therefore could not be carried out. To 
achieve the desired goals, however, ICC should be carried out for specific 
situations and should draw on the best available knowledge—on past 
experiences, understanding of processes and people, and also on recent 
research findings. I am also suggesting the separation of information from 
communication when carrying out such audits. For instance, in the case of 
an overheated pump, one should consider first what the contents of the 
message should be, who (or what equipment) should receive the signal, and 




  Major accidents bring about soul searching, careful examination of current 
practices and often  result in sweeping long term changes. In the United 
States the first major railroad accident became a turning point in safety 
management that brought about significant improvements throughout the 
industry. In 1841, two trains running on a single track railroad in 
Massachusetts, collided head-on. Two people were killed, eight were maimed, 
and nine others injured. With trains traveling at times at the "high speed" 
of 30 miles per hour, the magnitude of the accident created a public outrage. 
The investigation showed that the cause of the collision was failure of 
communication and insufficient programming. Plans for contingencies had 
been laid down but the various functions were not well integrated and lacked 
precision. To prevent similar accidents from happening in the future, the 
railroad's management devised the first extended industrial bureaucracy, 
instituted innovations in information processing and communication, and 
also established uniform procedures and contingency plans to exercise better 
control. As a result, railroad travel became relatively safe because of 
the new procedures and the coming of telegraphy in the 1840s, which provided 
the necessary control.3 The small American railroad companies were then 
able to proceed to develop a network that ultimately opened up and helped 
conquer the American frontier. Similar crises in control have been the 
result of the Industri.al Revolution, as Beniger points out.4 Today we have 
immense companies and more complex processes. But we also have greatly 
improved equipment and powerful tools for information and communication 
and, in day-to-day operations at least, we are able to exercise better 
control.
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  Some people would argue that safety  management is no different from the 
management of other projects. But this is not quite the case. Even if 
safety is incorporated into the goals and objectives of the company, it 
must adjust to the on-going activities within the organization, and the 
various areas within the organization are bound to be affected by the newly 
imposed concerns. Safety must not be an add-on project; it has to be woven 
into the fabric of ongoing operations. At the same time it must also have 
its own secondary structure within the organization with its own administ-
rative staff, procedures, and subsidiary communication networks. Safe 
practices and processes must be fully incorporated into process planning 
and design, which adds an additional dimension to the work. For those who 
still consider safety as an add-on, incorporating it into all activities 
implies great expenses and sub-optimal operations; in particular, 
retrofitting a plant that has not been designed to operate under the safest 
conditions adds further complications. 
  The various attempts to quantify the state of safety, whether they are 
risk analyses, number of lost time accidents, statistics on material losses, 
mean time between failures (MTB) or accidental releases into the environment, 
do not measure the effort involved in staying alert to prevent those 
accidents or even the effort to change everyday habits and routine 
operations. Quantifyinf the combination of factors necessary to reduce 
risk or evaluation and training--especially the training needed to respond 
to emergency situations--is still rather fuzzy. 
Process engineering. Design predetermines the inherent risk in a chemical 
plant. Albeit engineers intend to design safe processes, lack of knowledge,
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cost considerations, or time pressures have often resulted in designs that 
were inadequate from the standpoint of safety and environmental control. 
With the changing societal expectations, however, consideration of these 
risks has become mandatory and has shifted the cost/economics factors  coming 
into play when a process is being selected. From a safety standpoint the 
storage and transportation of the feedstock, product, and byproducts must now 
be considered at this early stage. Who can authorize and who can make 
changes in the process or in the equipment, and who can supervise repairs 
must also be determined. 
  A critical series of data to be collected during the design phase would 
be a listing of the assumptions of the designer about the process and the 
equipment specified. This kind of information is not now collected 
systematically. It is cumbersome to define fully; in the past it would 
have resulted in a maze of paper, making it difficult if not inpossible to 
find the critical data when most needed. Desktop computers, cheap storage, 
good database-management software, and, the more recent optical disc systems 
make it easier to record the assumptions made during the design phase and 
to store them for easy retrieval. Such information can be useful years 
later, when, for instance a reaction vessel needs repair or when a heat 
exchanger is about to be re-used. Then the knowledge whether the equipment 
was expected to withstand 800°F or 1000°F temperature and 500 lb/in2 
pressure, will be valuable from a design as well as a safety standpoint. 
   To have a record of the changes made when a plant was put on stream or 
during operations would be most important for process design and engineering. 
Information of past experiences would also be useful in the development of 
knowledge-based or expert systems.5 A database of mishaps and accidents
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would be useful in maintaining safety in the plant, and invaluable for 
process design. Records of "near misses," similar to those required for 
flight safety, would make such databases even more useful. Regrettably, 
however, the trend for suing companies has created such an adversary climate 
in the United States that companies are hesitant to expend the cost and 
effort to keep more extensive records only to leave themselves open to 
further lawsuits. 
  When ICC programs are initiated, the data elements making up such 
databases should be  defined and their organization determined critically. 
To be truly useful, the database should contain all the information 
describing a unit and what was done to it during its history. Here again it 
would be important to include what the assumptions were at the time of repair 
(e.g. that the ambient temperature would not go below the freezing point, or 
that the pressure to which a pipe will be exposed would not exceed the type 
of welding done at the time). 
  A frequent cause of accidents is a "small" repair job, where someone 
wanted to fix a broken piece of equipment in a hurry to keep the plant 
running. To prevent careless and dangerous repairs, first of all, ways 
should be devised with the aid of computer graphics or interactive optical 
disc systems to make it easier for operators to record such changes. Prompts 
and menus could help in entering the information semi-automatically. Besides 
having the information about the repair available for review, the requirement 
to make a record will by itself make people more cautious. 
  An ICC would call for the planning and inclusion of feedforward activities 
at the time when the process or the plant is designed. Not only what 
information should be conveyed but also how it should be communicated should
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be a concern of the designer. But, as in other areas of information 
management, appropriate experts, such as experienced operators, human 
resource specialists, or robotics specialists, should be consulted to create 
the appropriate prompts and responses. To reduce failures and improve 
safety, interactive magnetic or optical disc based repair manuals could be 
built directly into control  equipment. Thus, when in the future an 
indication that any part of the plant is about to be repaired is entered 
into the computer/workstation, appropriate warning messages, graphics, and 
minimum specifications should be displayed automatically. These would not 
only alert operators and engineers, but such communication would also aid and 
educate them at the time when they must act in a hurry but might not know 
enough about the process to make sound decisions. Such communication may 
be equally useful for less experienced supervisors who have to approve the 
completed work. Being in such an interactive mode operators could stay 
alert, receive prompts or further training on the spot if needed and would 
be helped in making sound decisions under pressure. 
Communication and Information 
  Timely information transfer and communications links are essential to 
reach people at the appropriate level or for signalling to equipment. They 
are crucial for community emergency response, for large organizations in 
general, and for operations of complex chemical plants. To prevent accidents 
various scenarios must be considered. Several good methods have been 
developed, such as the hazards and operation analyses (HAZAN and HAZOP), 
which are most useful but not sufficient for safety management.
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  Through an information/communication check the control of operations 
would be  extended. The information or data that must be transmitted would 
be determined more carefully together with the array possible responses, 
and how they should be signalled. Training, to be discussed later, is 
another mode of information transfer that should be examined critically. 
  The probability for accidents to occur is much higher at physical or 
divisional interfaces and must therefore receive additional attention. 
What information is necessary, how it should be communicated for each step 
at the time of startup or shut down, who must have the information, and who 
must be reached if the reaction gets out of hand should a major emergency 
arise, are some of the questions that must be asked, and would be followed 
up as part of an information/communication check-out. The ICC would thus 
call to attention to the need for more effective preventive nieasures, by 
forcing further analysis of unstable situations. 
  But an ICC should also consider the feedforward information needed. 
Moving backwards in time, for instance, some elements in the training of 
operators may be added as a result and a fresh look at testing the operators' 
understanding; the ICC should also lead to questions as to what knowledge 
supervisors should have so that they can critically evaluate and manage a 
potentially perilous situation. It should bring out discussions among those 
involved to determine whether additional warning lights, flashes, sounds, 
or images on the monitor screen would be most helpful for decision making 
and would most likely to elicit the necessary action. Such analyses, tieing 
certain situations directly to specific operations and actions that are to 
be carried out ahead of time and giving direction to activities that will
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be happening considerably later is a strength of an ICC, ensuring review 
 and feedback. 
           Transportation of chemicals, another vulnerable operation, belongs to a 
different category, where an ICC will lead to determining more precisely 
the appropriate interaction with the community, the carriers, and organ-
izations providing fast and reliable information about loads of chemicals 
en route. The latter has been enhanced in the U.S. by recently enforced 
laws and by the Federal Emergency Management Administration that reaches 
into communities and ensures regionally coordinated response to emergencies. 
In a country unaccustomed to centralized control except under war conditions, 
amakudari, a migration of officers from the military into civilian jobs 
provides needed leadership. With their training in decision making, 
communication and control, they can impose control on the structure and 
improve coordination of federal, regional and local action. 
Information. An ICC cannot be suddenly produced for the entire organization 
but should be gradually developed and the loose ends tied down with care. 
More so than with other projects, external information must be gathered. 
Making it available throughout the organization is more important because 
much of the information is collected in different parts of the company. 
  Information on legal requirements must be gathered and data on compliance 
must be collected. For safety management, however, the professional staff 
must also be aware of the internal policy of the organization to know how to 
interpret the letter of the law. In case of partially owned overseas 
subsidiaries, for instance a determination will have to be made whether to 
operate according to local or domestic standards. Recently, when Beechnut, 
an American company built a baby-food processing plant as a joint venture
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with China, the company insisted following the product safety standards 
required in the U.S. Thus employees of the plant had to become familiar 
with standards that differed considerably from local practices. 
  Small companies often cannot afford information services that can compare 
with those of large enterprises. And some of the large companies are 
concerned how their small customers will safely dispose of  hazardous 
chemicals. Small organizations, however, should be able to ensure that 
they obtain the external information needed for safety management. They 
can turn to their manufacturers association, government agencies, or 
professional associations for assistance. In several countries governmental 
or semi-governmental organizations can provide such support. In others, such 
as the U.S., small companies should also consider negotiating such support 
as part of the business contract they draw up with the large firms that are 
their suppliers or their customers. 
  The coordination of internal information needed for safety management is 
more complex because it is so closely tied to information resource management 
(IRM) in the organization, which typically is not well coordinated either. 
Similarly to general information resource policies, those for the internal 
information needed for safety management must be established. Databases 
must be made accessible across the company and be compatible with one 
another. Searching through relational databases, which would make such 
access possible, can be slow. Yet, to be truly useful, databases should be 
so organized to enable future users to analyze and correlate data in ways 
that were not expected when the database was first designed. These concerns 
are vital when considering information for safety management: today one of 
the problems of gathering data is that they may well be available in
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corporate  databases but are buried because the databases had been organized 
to suit other organizational purposes. 
  Other practices gained from organizing corporate information should also 
be followed. It is essential that all groups affected by the data or have 
special expertise in areas related to safety, be involved in determining 
what information is needed, how valid data can be obtained, and what 
databases should be set up. Therefore, establishing a company-wide safety 
information committee would be most useful. This group would be different 
from but should cooperate with the plant safety committee. Its members 
should also include people from computing and others with technical knowledge 
of instrumentation; management participation is important; in addition, 
outside engineering contractors might also be called in, if their 
contribution would be relevant. Internal information issues should be 
determined by such a committee, which would be similar to other panels of 
data managers. The committee on safety information should be able to decide 
on the person who should be responsible for making changes in the databases, 
what response should be signalled, and in what form the data should be 
communicated--from failure prevention to emergency readiness. Some of the 
decisions would be detailed and appear minor, yet they can be critical to 
the company and the surrounding community. 
  Such detailed work takes considerable time and effort. It is costly, not 
only because of the expense of computing and control devices required, but 
because the best people, who can least be spared from their regular 
assignments, are the ones who should be involved in determining internal 
information needs for safety. Therefore, without senior management 
commitment, such a broad-based activity would not be possible. It seems to
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me that organizing such an effort  is more difficult in the United States 
than in Japan, where management is based in consensus. Work habits differ. 
Even the way offices are organized in the U.S., where everyone works at his 
or her own desk, the people are not attuned for continuous personal 
interaction. 
  Still, just as safety can be built into process design, information 
support for safety management should also be part of a corporate information 
plan. That challenge, however, requires additional thought and careful. 
planning. The technical developments in computers and optical systems, 
computer graphics, and personal computers, brought about a shift in the way 
information is managed in companies. How the information is organized and 
how fast it moves up or down the line to the individuals for decision making 
or action, however, is more important for safety management than in other 
areas of information resource management. Bureaucratic actions must also be 
translated precisely into the powerful computer programs governing emergency 
responses. Some of the safety and emergency response systems, carried out 
in a paper or microfiche-based environment, would not have been viable and 
would have led to a mire of paperwork. With compatibility of databases, 
connectivity of documents, and some use of knowledge based systems, better 
and faster access to the needed information can be provided throughout the 
company and even to the outside community. 
Communication. Information is tied to decision making and to operations. 
When there is a deviation from normal, a critical factor in preventing major 
damage is a fast response to the signal received. Automatic responses, and 
the fine points of automatic control are being refined by equipment
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manufacturers. In safety management not only the content of the message 
but how it is transmitted can make a vital difference. The symbols and 
signals used, should depend on the specific situation. Clearly an indication 
should be given when a pump is overheating, for example; a more powerful 
indication, possibly some pre-recorded verbal prodding could be next. Such 
sequential prompting would cut down on the possibilities of the situation 
getting out of hand when an alarm would be needed. 
  Traditionally the choice in  the way in which messages were communicated 
was fairly limited. Now a number of options are available, such as flashing 
lights, sound, prerecorded messages, text and images on monitor screens, in 
addition to people talking, instructing, or cajoling one another. Some 
control systems are superbly efficient. A well planned ICC would follow up 
on the effectiveness of the communication methods, would provide feedback 
for trainers and initiate evaluation of changed practices. If a database 
of past corporate experiences existed, pertinent information could be 
retrieved to help in the evaluations. Many options exist for data 
presentation, and are being used extensively. Data, for instance can be 
analyzed and re-formatted to make it more easy for an engineer to evaluate 
a process, or a manager to absorb the information. But not all changes are 
in the high-tech areas. Placement of gauges and signs in the plant, for 
instance, should be at eye level, be legible and be presented in a sequence 
that would be most comfortable for people. For safe practices, human 
engineering should also be considered in all instrument design. 
To alert operators about an impending failure the information on the 
monitor can be a scheme of the equipment, a cartoon, a graphic interpretation 
of a complex analysis that was carried out automatically, or step by step
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 instructions delivered through a menu. Troubleshooting can be greatly 
assisted by diagrams, and optical discs allow operators to "walk around" 
the plant, obtain information about any piece of equipment, and receive 
expert advice on how to repair or install it. 
Memoranda are being enhanced by inserting computer-aided calculations; two 
people on different continents can recall the same graphics in order to 
consult on a specific problem. In case of an impending emergency situation 
voice instructions can be triggered automatically when warning lights start 
to flash. 
  Because safety warnings are at times ignored or overridden, an ICC should 
explore how often messages should be sent, what sequence of signals would 
be most useful. Sometimes people do not react "properly" to a warning 
signal. If it becomes obvious that their intuitive reaction is different, 
not only should the signal be changed but,as a result of an ICC, the training 
should also be modified. In some sensitive situations an information/-
communication check can indicate that alternative signals are necessary 
when experience indicated was no response to warnings. For example, at 
this point certain decisions would have to be made how best to signal that 
high readings of a thermocouple should be investigated, whether it should be 
controlled by automatic sensors flashing lights, the use of luminescent 
paint on the equipment, or a foreman insisting that operators check out all 
possible causes before assuming that the thermocouple is defective. 
  Another concern that an ICC should address, is how often a message should 
be repeated as a reminder or for reinforcement. When are weekly reminders 
or monthly newsletters useful and when should a message be signalled when 
readings are outside a safe range? Will the intuitive reaction of operators
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to flashing signals be different from the prescribed actions? It has been 
shown that many accidents are caused by operators ignoring safety messages 
rather  than not knowing about them. Some feedback mechanism should be 
established that would give an internal indication when people start ignoring 
safety related messages. 
  An ICC is not designed to differentiate between operator and management 
failures. The ICC is just a tool which will call attention to potential 
information and communication gaps that would endanger safe operations. An 
attempt to find answers to the questions raised should not be restricted to 
shallow changes in information transfer or modification of signals. The 
questions raised might lead to further examination of the cognitive issues 
raised by Rasmussen,6 and to the exploration of how people are likely to 
react in a certain situation. A pragmatic ICC can also lead to the review 
of equipment design or even a modification of processes, thus, ultimately, 
bringing about safer operations. 
  Areas ripe for research will also become obvious after a thorough 
information/communication check. But even without deep research studies, 
some pragmatic tests can be run. At whom is the information aimed and is 
it communicated in the best possible way? Is it directed to the executive 
officer of the company or to operators? Did they understand the 
communication, how well did they absorb it, or remember it? Did they act 
on it, or would they act on it under frightening emergency conditions? Did 
they consider the message important enough to discuss it with others and 
make certain that others understand it? 
  So far I have discussed direct communication. But more subtle, indirect 
transmission of messages can also contribute significantly to safety
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 management. Such subtle messages can emanate from the inherent culture, 
the attitude of senior management, perceptions of fellow workers, the effect 
of various training methods, and a person's own psychological and 
physiological constraints. All of these affect safety management and their 
effect cannot be easily quantified and might escape discovery during an 
ICC . 
  None of us, until confronted with another culture, is aware of the 
peculiarities of our own cultural orientation. Changes in formal 
communication can be effected by fiat, a simple decision. But changes are 
occurring in society. They come subtly and gradually, as sociologists in 
many countries have pointed out. The messages conveyed by a small community 
or by the corporate culture cannot be changed overnight. But it is possible 
to make deliberate changes in attitude. In recent years, for instance, a 
renewed emphasis on quality and reliability in American companies has also 
contributed to their safety. 
   The attitude of senior management towards safety management, as senior 
management attitudes in all other areas of importance, will be picked up 
rapidly by subordinates. There are stories in quite a few U.S. companies 
on how plant managers turned poorly functioning plants around and 
dramatically improved their safety records. They could accomplish this by 
being present at the time when shifts were changing, listening to problems, 
noticing spills and asking about them, and by discussing the technical 
problems and follow-up actions with depertnent heads. Their attitudes were 
quickly conveyed to the middle managers and were carried through even faster 
when middle nanagers were held responsible for breaches in safety. A single 
manager was able to turn a poor plant around by creating an esprit de corps.
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 Coming into a new position, these plant managers stated that the plant was 
going to be improved and become a model operation, and then provided the 
necessary leadership. Administrative steps were taken, and existing problems 
were explored. Such managers can instill in the workers a pride in the 
plant, which then leads to their willingness to ensure the quality of their 
own wo rk . 
  Thus management has many ways to turn attitudes around through its 
actions. If a chief executive officer or executive vice president demands 
to hear of any lost time accident, or middle managers then have to report 
on actions taken to avoid similar accidents in the future, the results will 
be visible and the message will be clear down the line. 
Training is a crucial part of safety management and draws on all aspects of 
knowledge transfer. It involves everyone form operators to executives. 
The experience of motivators, psychologists, and educators can lead to more 
effective courses and development of useful training aids. 
with processes and equipment becoming more complex, and in the U.S., the 
change to an increasingly multi-ethnic population, which may be less well 
schooled than earlier generations, training has become more important on 
the operator level, and for the university graduates, who need further 
practical training in the technical, administrative and management aspects 
of safety. Training must be carried out on such a large scale in 
multinational companies, that any efficiency that can be introduced without 
damaging the quality of training can save millions of dollars. Interactive 
videodiscs have shown themselves to be effective tools; in some specific 
areas they have proven to be as good as instructor based training. Since
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the number of good instructors is limited, and scheduling can  be made at 
the convenience of the trainee,  the popularity of interactive training  i s 
fast gaining support. Furthermore, if the course is well planned, the most 
effective training methods can be used in installations throughout the 
country, and, if necessary, modified to suit different physical or cultural 
conditions at plant locations abroad. 
  Whether operators get hands on experience or use simulators, attend 
classes, read notes, watch video tapes or participate in interactive computer 
or optical disc programs, is secondary to the message that has to be 
conveyed. No matter how it is delivered, training must be evaluated. Using 
more interactive technology, where objectives must be clearly determined to 
be effective, and testing can be built in, better ways to evaluate training 
effectiveness will be devised. In the case of safety, however, such 
evaluation may be more difficult: many who are perfectly capable of 
answering safety related questions will not necessarily carry over their 
knowledge into their daily activities. 
   Earlier in the discussion I mentioned that feedforward training should 
be initiated at the engineering design stage, and feedback at a point when 
equipment failed, an accident occurred, or repairs were needed. Training 
should be ultimately included in an ICC---not to devise courses, but to ensure 
that the proper interconnections are made and the feedback and feedforward 
cycles are properly attuned. Such information would also ensure that 
operators returning from a long absence or substituting temporarily in jobs 
with which they are not entirely familiar, will have the proper knowledge 
to carry out the job safely. Here too, interactive courseware can be well 
used.
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  As mentioned  earlier, the subtle aspects of -safety consciousness come 
from every area of work, should be, and typically are included in technical 
training, as well as the training for technical managers on the job. A 
young engineer, however, will not be exposed to safety management training 
during his university years. While safety will be mentioned in courses, the 
interest of faculty members lies in other areas of engineering and safety 
will rarely be taught as a major challenge to engineering and to good design. 
  Clearly, well run companies are carrying out excellent safety programs. 
These programs, however, vary greatly; every subsidiary has different 
procedures--with the critical proof being the absence or reduction of 
accidents, safety is one of the few corporate areas where no uniform 
procedures exist. The actual cost of safety training, very likely far 
exceeds estimates. 
New activities, added benefits 
  At the very least an information/communications checkup should improve 
safety and emergency readiness of the plant. Improved methodology for safety 
management would be another benefit, as would be a greatly improved estimate 
of the true cost of safety training. A review and consolidation of ICC 
findings could enable senior management to obtain an integrated outlook of 
the state of safety and emergency readiness in the organization. 
  From a safety management point of view, an ICC would ascertain that 
communication channels are clear: that messages are communicated to people 
at the appropriate levels, with the appropriate timing and urgency. 
  With the kind of documentary backup an ICC follow-up can provide, 
companies will also be in a better position to advise manufacturers of
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equipment or software producers, explain their needs more clearly or suggest 
 modifications that will make it easier to carry out safe practices. These 
changes might suggest changes in signals, in frequency, or recommend an 
automatic forwarding of messages be it control of equipment or messages up 
the line from operators to executives, from citizens to emergency response 
centers. 
Such advice from an operating organization is especially important, because 
there are not enough programmers available in software houses who fully 
understand the technical as well as the human engineering requirements of 
an organization. 
There are areas to which we do not have clearcut answers, and systematic 
work will have to be done to determine optimal situations. One of these is 
how to ensure improved safety through automation and still keep operators 
interested and alert to recognize unusual situations. Since their jobs can 
become less interesting the keenest operators might , and possibly be 
replaced by less capable people in order to save costs. While these people 
may be qualified to carry out daily operations, they may have difficulties 
coping with emergencies. Thus, creating interest in the task, which has 
become practically fully automated, is a challenge to operating companies 
and to the research community. 
   The findings of an ICC could be most useful for academic researchers--in 
part giving information to questions they may already have been asking, and, 
just as importantly, to raise questions in their minds that would lead to 
meaningful research. At this stage the research areas that would benefit 
safety management most have not yet been delineated. One of the fortuitous 
results would be some the cross-pollination of industrial experience and
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know-how with university based fundamental research in the technical, 
management, and cognitive sciences. 
Conclusion 
  Safety must be built into process design, operations, and all other plant 
 activities. The information/communication check discussed in this paper is 
a suggestion to carry out more systematically what is being done piecemeal 
in everyday practice. 
  An ICC can serve as a tool to conceptually integrate safety management 
throughout the organization, and emergency readiness with the outside 
community. The information and communication system supporting safety should 
ideally be integrated into the corporate information system, yet have its 
own character. 
A. major contribution of such an ICC would be to identify barriers, which 
can then be overcome. The checkups suggested will not solve the problems 
of safety and emergency response but will add another strong tool to insure 
that all that can reasonably be done to reduce failures and avoid accidents, 
will be done. The result will be a better managed safety and emergency 
response program, greater accountability by individuals, and, ultimately, a 
better managed organization. 
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-I he relationship of safety management. clicmistry. 
and inforniation science is symbolired by two inter-
national meetings that are being organi7ed by Professor 
Shikuo i=ujiwara, director of the Institute for Infor-
mation and Knowledge of Knnngawn University. in• 
Yokohama. 'I he U.S.-Japan Forum on Safety Manage-
ment (to be held November 10. 1981. co-sponsored by 
the American Institute of Chemicnl Engineers) and the 
International Conference on Information and Knowl-
edp,e (November 1 I - 13) will cover the topics in breadth 
and explore sonie of their fundnniental aspects. 
 Laboratory chemists do not have to be reminded of 
the importance of safety or the increasing role of 
analytical chemistry in maintaining process conditions 
by monitoring chemical reactions, testing materials, or 
determiriing environmental effects. Control. Instrunien-
tntion, and information are essential factors when at-
tempting to 
I) ninintain desired (normal) conditions 
 2) ritonitor deviations to make it possible to take 
    control before a situation gets out of hand 
 3) be prepared to react appropriately to totally un-
    expected events 
 4) be ready to take effective action if the situation 
    should get out of control. 
Information management has also been a continuing 
concern to chemists, who «ere the first scientists In 
the ninetecrith century to establish an abstract journal 
in the field to gain control over the fast growing tech-
nical literature. WIth the emergence of new nod im-
proved information technologies, and Ivork hi the 
cognitive sciences, we have barely begun to grasp the 
close relationship of control, instrumentation. infor-
mation, and humian factors. 
  Safety nianagenietit, which includes the laboratory or 
plant, as well as the total environnient. oilers a fertile lield 
of exploration for information scientists. Information 
support for safety nianagenicnt must transcend tradi-
tional information aork. Special attention must be paid 
not only to what information is transniitted but bow it is 
comniunicated and how it is controlled. 1 bus 
inforimation trarisfer for safety mnnapement encom-
pnsscs the breadth of the field. fromi Instrunient sensing 
and robotics to kmowlcdgc Irnnslcr and trninimg. 
Information must he transniitted in «n^s that in-
dividuals at vnrious levels can absorb. remember. and 
net upon: Information about the cheinkaI tenetinns, 
histrumentntion, about the need for sale practices. and 
what to do in etirergencies. \Ve are hist beginning III 
hike into account the cultural ntid social Nelms 1then 
considering both lnfortiiatioti and snlety nr:itiagcrncnl.
  Over the past century technology has beetomie nu-teas-
ingly science driven. Vet only recently did we tt, t^<r 
the findings of cognitive science, how the hmni:rrr mind 
works. ',creches the world, and interacts %litit H. 
'i his young tcicncc, evolving through the consolidation 
of se ctal disciplines. can prol idc a deeper under-
standing of the ways people catcgori7c their experiences 
and sensations or how Ihev might t reach in rcrt:^in silma-
lions. 'I bus the Insights pained through eogmiti'r eeiemee 
can :mike cruchtl contributions to both salrt% manage-
ment rind Inform:itIort science. 
I'ctc' areas oiler ehallcnges of the magnitude and 
vnriety to ininginative Information manngcrncnt at does 
safety management. %%herc practicril C prtictite. cn-
gineering knowledge and scicntiiic lititlitigs must trll be 
applied. Information most he sensed. Itamcnri1Iva. 
received, and interpreted. Iclicther the coriimnmientiori 
occurs between objccts--sucli as a pipe. :t reaction 
vessel, or n hcni sensor: nt the huniari-niacliine iriterlatc: 
or, among people be they operntots, proletsiomals, 
innringcrs, or. in cnse of cniergency. the golcrnor of n 
region. 'I he Information activities might irrcr^I'e:  
strumentation and control through robotics Ior mechan-
ical sensing, encoding. and transniittitig nn•cc:igcc: 
trnining of indis'idunls: or data collectiori. trancnrissiorr. 
and development of a consensus III dcIcrliiirit' iii'r rm:r) 
conditions in complex situations. Devout! h al'cr-b:r<ctl 
inforimtlio i and direct persori:tl ctirntnunientit'n. the 
advnnce; in cotmputcrinition on 1111 It•lrct'trt-
muiticrition. the availability of optical discs arc Iook 
oflcring rt boundless variety of %%nys Iii prt+'.ide inlmr-
tm:ition. 
As n director of the MI:rri:rgt: rmciit of Ihr 
American Institute of f'Iicniical I'nginccrc and '. it 
chairman of the Inlorniation for Indoclr% Committee tdl 
the International Federation of hdr'rim:rlit^n and 
Documentation (I'lI)! II) these issues Ir:ice ht•cn of 
pnrticulnr concern to me. and to colleagues in both mi 
these orgaliinntions and outside them. 
  New technologies and tle elopmirrtts iri the tognitict• 
sciences conipel us to I:ike n ltcsh look :it brolh Ihr caht tt 
nod ltdorrm:atmn lit'hI;. \\'c must te-r-c:intine A% !MI 
inlorrilalion should hr collected. t' Ililritc Iron ii •tu^muid 
he packaged and transmitted and lest to Ach:rt r\temt it 
is nbsorbetl, remembered, and used. Iletter town,' III 
ensure safe processes, to protect people, property, and 
the environrment, clearly, are clinllcngcs not only in 
scictitists, engineers, mnnngers, and environmentnlists, 
but also to inforrmntior: scientists.
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